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Nature is declining at unprecedented rates. We posit that the external effects of ecosystem 
degradation can be understood as a lack of property rights of stakeholders advocating on 
behalf of future generations and the intrinsic value of natural systems. The attempt to capture 
such property rights represents a transaction cost that is borne by environmental, indigenous 
and climate change movements. A number of environments worldwide have now been 
accorded Environmental Personhood (EP). We link the evolution of EP as nature’s equivalent 
of the firm to the history of corporations as legal entities. An economic case can be made for 
EPs to allow for 1) the objective of capturing total economic value subject to protecting the 
environment’s intrinsic value which is represented by the capability of the natural system to 
maintain its ecosystem functions; 2) a property rights structure opening for ecosystem trade-
offs among stakeholders, including those advocating on behalf of the environment and future 
generations; and 3) interactions among stakeholders that mediate transaction costs. 
 
Keywords: Environmental Personhood; Intrinsic Value; Stakeholder Trade-offs; Transaction 
Cost;  
Introduction 
Many of the world’s ecosystems are in decline. Scientists warn of ‘biological annihilation’ to 
the extent that the Earth’s sixth mass extinction is under way (Ceballos et al. 2017; Wake & 
Vredenburg 2008). A recent report by the UN estimates that nature is declining at rates 
unprecedented in human history (IPBES 2019). This matters because nature is essential for 
human existence and well-being, and to some extent, irreplaceable (IPBES 2019). The 
‘produce’ of natural environments, often involving human input to greater or lesser extent, 
are the constituents of human well-being, such as security, materials, health and social 
relations, all providing for human freedom of choice and action (MEA 2005). Well-being 
emanates from provisioning, regulating and cultural services, all standing on the shoulders of 
supporting services that feed into the former three. These ecosystem services are connected 
within natural environments, and interact with society via a multitude of complex 
interlinkages and stakeholders1. A recent report by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment in New Zealand, for example, highlights the many pressures on estuaries from 
urban wastewater treatment plants, farms, forests, fishing, aquaculture and shipping, 
exacerbated by overlapping jurisdiction and changing policy documents (PCE 2020). The IPBES 
(2019) summarizes the many stressors on nature as changes in land and sea use; direct 
exploitation of organisms; climate change; pollution; and invasion of alien species, driven by 
production and consumption patterns, population growth, trade, technological innovations 
and governance. 
                                                          
1 The ecosystem service framework has been well expounded in the literature and is now the most widely 
adopted framework for understanding how nature produces benefits for humans, how to quantify the rate and 
value of these services and how to model the interconnections between human wellbeing and ecological systems 
(e.g. Villamagna et al. 2013; Daily and Matson 2008; Nahlik et al. 2012; Tallis et al. 2008). 
Maintaining ecosystem services and restoring degraded ecosystems has become an important 
goal for intergenerational wellbeing, a thought that is echoed by Pearce et al.’s (1989) 
argument for strong sustainability and recently by climate change movements such as 
Generation Zero and Greta Thunberg. Ecosystem services that provide for ‘the benefits people 
obtain from ecosystems’ (MEA 2005) are anthropocentric, and the case for conservation is 
often made using Pearce et al.’s (1989) total economic value (TEV) framework that 
distinguishes use values from non-use values (e.g. Richardson and Loomis 2009; Tietenberg 
and Lewis 2018)2. At the center of the economic approach lies the application of regulation, 
taxes and property rights to manage natural resource utilization. 
However, this worldview is at odds with many indigenous peoples, such as Māori in New 
Zealand, who have long negated the notion of ownership of natural resources, emphasizing 
the protection of environments through stewardship or guardianship (e.g. Harmsworth and 
Awatere 2013; Kahui and Cullinane 2019). Similarly, the deep ecology movement has argued 
for an inherent worth of nature, a long-standing debate that has centered on the dichotomy 
between whether nature has instrumental value and should be protected for humans’ sake, 
or whether it has intrinsic value and should be protected for its own sake (see e.g. Chan et al. 
2016; Arias-Arevalo et al. 2017). More recently, the concept of intrinsic value has been 
augmented by relational values, which pertain to all manner of relationships between humans 
and nature, including human-human relationships facilitated by natural environments (e.g. 
Chan et al. 2018).  
                                                          
2 The total economic value (TEV) framework has been used extensively in the environmental economics literature 
and is now the most commonly adapted framework in valuation studies (see e.g. Costanza et al. 1997).  
In this paper, we take the anthropocentric worldview where arguments for conservation 
center on the provision of benefits to humans, subject to the capability of the natural system 
to maintain its ecosystem functions. This capability is embodied by the view of resource 
management by many indigenous peoples, such as by Māori, who focus on the importance of 
utilizing resources in a fashion that does not compromise the ‘mauri’ (vital essence; life force) 
and integrity of the system (Williams 2006). It aligns with the concept of intrinsic value to 
encourage responsible action, but can also be understood as a safe minimum standard “or the 
minimum quantity of ecosystem structure and process (including diversity, populations, 
interactions, etc.), that is required to maintain a well-functioning ecosystem capable of 
supplying services” (Fisher et al. 2008, p. 2053).   
The continued degradation of ecosystems poses an externality to society and we posit that 
this externality can be understood as a lack of property rights of stakeholders advocating on 
behalf of the intrinsic value of natural systems and the sustainable utilization of natural 
resources for future generations3. The attempt to capture and protect such property rights 
legally and publicly represents a transaction cost that is experienced by environmental, 
indigenous and climate change movements4, highlighting the insurmountable task of 
efficiently sorting the many ecosystem service trade-offs connected to human activity. In 1972 
Stone proposed the ‘unthinkable’ of awarding nature legal rights to allow legal action at its 
                                                          
3 Barzel (1997) differentiates between legal and economic property rights – the first is what a state assigns to a 
‘person’ (de jure), while the second is the ability to enjoy a piece of property (de facto). Here we understand 
property rights to mean a combination of these two, as legal personhood is assigned by the state, but the focus 
is on the enjoyment or utility of property, and how the ability to make choices in relation to this utility is organized 
by stakeholders. 
4 The MEA (2005) connects ecosystem services to well-being, and as such advocacy to avoid nature loss may 
extend to all socio-economic aspects of society. We focus on environmental, indigenous and climate change 
movements to represent targeted advocacy for nature. 
behest, that in determining damages, courts would have to take injury to the environment 
into account and that any damages awarded would benefit the environment itself. At the time, 
the idea was radical, not too dissimilar to the lengthy conceptualization of legal personhood 
for corporations since the medieval times. In 2008, Ecuador was the first country to explicitly 
recognize the rights of nature, followed by Bolivia in 2010 and smaller grassroots movements 
in the USA (O’Donnell and Talbot-Jones 2018). More recently, in 2014, the New Zealand 
parliament declared that Te Urewera, a forested, sparsely populated hill country region in the 
North Island, “is a legal entity, and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal 
person” (Te Urewera Act 2014). Three rivers were to follow in 2017, including the Ganges and 
Yamuna rivers in India, and the Whanganui River in New Zealand, which was recognized as 
“an indivisible and living whole comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the 
sea, incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements” (Te Awa Tupua Act 2017); and 
most recently, in 2021, Quebec’s Magpie River has become the first in Canada to be granted 
environmental personhood (EP). Since Stone (1972; 2010) the literature on EP for natural 
objects has been growing rapidly ranging from the analysis of case studies (Talbot-Jones 2017; 
O’Donnell and Talbot-Jones 2018), EP as a new property rights system (Talbot-Jones and 
Bennett 2019), EP as a way to address the tragedy of the ecosystem commons in line with a 
Maori indigenous view (Kahui and Cullinane 2019), and EP as a legal concept (Gindis 2016; 
Gordon 2018; Naffine 2009; Naffine 2012; Hutchison 2014). 
In this paper we lay out how the concept of EP, can, in a somewhat heterodox fashion, be 
understood within a neo-classical economic paradigm applying the frameworks of ecosystem 
services (MEA 2005), or nature’s contribution to people (IPBES 2017), potentially providing a 
structure for incorporating and internalising ecosystem service trade-offs. We provide a 
summary of the history of the emergence of corporations as legal entities (i.e. corporate 
personhood) and the theory of the firm, which provides the necessary background knowledge 
to explore the evolvement of EP to allow for ecosystem service trade-offs in competing uses 
and benefits of multiple stakeholders within and across generations. We find that an economic 
case can be made for the evolution of EP to allow for 1) the objective of capturing the total 
economic value, subject to its intrinsic value which is represented by the capability of the 
natural system to maintain its ecosystem functions; 2) a property rights structure opening for 
the organization of relevant stakeholders, including those advocating on behalf of the 
environment and future generations; and 3) interactions and trade-offs among stakeholders 
that mediate transaction costs, thereby creating a price mechanism that includes the cost of 
externalities. 
The following sections provide an outline of the evolution of the legal personhood of 
corporations and of natural environments, an economic analysis, and a discussion and 
conclusion of our arguments. 
 
The evolution of legal personhood for non-human entities 
Black’s Law Dictionary (2019) defines a legal person or entity as “a lawful or legally standing 
association, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, trust, or individual, which has legal 
capacity to (1) enter into agreements or contracts, (2) assume obligations, (3) incur and pay 
debts, (4) sue and be sued in its own right, and (5) to be accountable for illegal activities”. In 
general terms, a ‘person’ is understood to refer to a natural human being, but in Black’s Law 
Dictionary, a legal person more accurately reflects its original Latin persona meaning of an 
actor’s mask which is worn in the legal domain (Gindis 2016). The concept of a legal person is 
a cluster of rights and duties, which can be assigned to both human and non-human entities 
(Naffine 2009). For human entities, the evolution of basic human rights reaches back to the 
19th century, when the abolition of slavery and coverture of married women entailed a process 
of transformation from property to separate legal personality (Gindis 2016). Dawson (1994) 
observes that “[c]hildren, married women, bankrupts, lunatics, Jews and foreigners have all 
been assigned a distinct legal status within the history of common law, distinguishing their 
legal position from the norm of the adult, male, solvent, sane, Christian citizen.” (quoted in 
Naffine (2009), p. 12).  
For non-human entities, the concept of legal personhood for corporations stretches back to 
medieval scholars who spent hundreds of years struggling to understand how the Church and 
the State could, as public entities, transcend the living pope and king (Gierke 1900; Stone 
1972). The fundamental idea emerged that ‘bodies corporate’, including towns, religious 
groups, universities and guilds, had a life beyond that of their members which came to be 
codified by medieval law (Truitt 2006; Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2018). These corporate 
persons started to represent permanent organizational structures that preserved the customs 
of groups, generated wealth and passed it intact to future generations. The immortal status 
of these bodies is best illustrated by the Church (Allen 1995), or corporations such as the 
Corporation of London and the Aberdeen Harbour Board in Scotland, which date back to the 
12th century and exist to this day (Truitt 2006).  
It is somewhat inconceivable to the modern eye that medieval scholars spent hundreds of 
years struggling with the legitimacy of private property and the notion that corporate entities 
could exist in law. Yet once conceptualized and legitimized, it provided a catalyst for business 
activities that allowed individuals to share risks and rewards. Merchants, bankers, guilds and 
companies formed associations that allowed them to pool funds and finance the shipment of 
goods to distant ports, and in the 16th and 17th century, the business idea of the ‘chartered 
company’ was born (Truitt 2006). Wealthy merchants and members of the aristocracy were 
given a charter by European monarchs as a vehicle for imperial expansion, leading to the 
establishment of well-known companies such as the British East India Company, the Virginia 
Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company.  
The economic success of these chartered companies was built on the two fundamental ideas 
of joint-stock ownership and limited-liability (Truitt 2006)5. In 1862, the British Parliament 
passed the Companies Act which furnished the limited-liability joint-stock company with a 
new feature: anyone, at any time, for any purpose, could form a company, i.e. it was no longer 
necessary to seek a charter from parliament to set up a company and limit its operation to a 
worthy aim (Truitt 2006). The Companies Act was rapidly copied by most of Europe and the 
US and gave birth to the modern corporation as we know it. 
The limited-liability joint-stock company as a distinct legal entity has provided a vehicle for 
entrepreneurship and wealth creation. The ability to vest control in the corporation itself has 
given rise to the metaphor ‘corporate personality’ or ‘corporate personhood’ (CP). As Farrar 
(2007) observes, the corporation is a fictitious person representing a group of shareholders, 
but is not identical with that group in the sense that it is treated as a separate ‘person’ in law.  
                                                          
5 For example, the Muscovy Company of 1555, chartered by the English Crown to have exclusive trading rights 
between England and Russia, raised money to finance voyages by selling shares that could be traded, with the 
liability of shareholders limited to the amount of their investment. 
The evolution of CP has provided the legal structure for people to interact efficiently and reach 
individual and collective economic goals6 (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Transaction, the 
transfer of goods and services from one individual to another, is the fundamental unit of 
analysis in the theory of economic organization. In his seminal article entitled “The nature of 
the firm” (which we play on in the title of this paper) (1937) Ronald Coase explains the 
existence of the firm, as opposed to ‘being one’s own master’, as emanating from the 
transaction cost of using the price mechanism: “The most obvious cost of “organizing” 
production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are” 
(op cit., p.83). The price mechanism ensures the efficient allocation of resources, but in order 
to secure this allocation, transaction costs, i.e., the costs of search and negotiation, and 
monitoring and enforcement, are incurred (Griffin 1991; Challan 2000). The organization of 
firms is therefore structured such as to maximize value net transaction costs, and hence 
secure the efficient function of the price mechanism (Allen 1998).  
 
The evolution of environmental personhood (EP) 
In 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected a lawsuit by an environmental 
organization that sought to block the development of a ski resort in the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains (Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727). The case is well known because Justice 
                                                          
6 According to Truitt (2006; p. 73); (1) the corporation provides a centralized management structure for 
organizations to conduct business (buying and selling property, signing contracts, borrowing money, etc.); (2) 
capital can be raised through the issuance of stocks and bonds; (3) the corporation mitigates risk (shareholders, 
directors and managers are protected from personal liability for the actions of the corporation by limiting the 
extent of the risk to the amount of investment); (4) ownership can be easily transferred by buying and selling 
shares in an open market; and (5) the corporation asserts its own entity separate to that of stakeholders, which 
provides the ability to own assets, capital and land in the corporation’s name and allows continued existence 
(bar dissolution by stakeholders or bankruptcy).  
William O. Douglas famously dissented arguing that environmental objects should be granted 
legal personhood. The idea to give legal rights to ‘natural objects’ within the environment, or 
environmental personhood (EP), in the same way to how corporate entities legitimately act 
as legal personhoods, started with Stone’s (1972) publication “Should trees have standing? – 
Legal rights towards natural objects” in the Southern Californian Law Review. In his 
increasingly famous paper (now published as a book – Stone 2010), Stone argues that without 
EP natural objects in the environment rely entirely on affected parties to take legal action and 
that compensation accrues to the affected parties rather than the natural object itself.  
To date, many of the cases in which natural entities have been assigned legal personhood 
came as a response to stakeholder conflicts and continued environmental degradation. The 
history of ownership over the Whanganui River in New Zealand between the indigenous Māori 
tribe, the Whanganui iwi, and the British Crown, is a case in point7. In 1848 the Crown 
jurisdiction had asserted ownership over the greater Whanganui area, which included the 
river, allowing over time for economic activities such as gravel abstraction, steamer operations 
and other river works. These activities impacted on navigability, scenic preservation, fisheries 
and eel weirs leading to ongoing protest and legal challenges by the Whanganui iwi who raised 
concerns for the river’s health and the desire to preserve the resource for future generations 
(Whanganui River Māori Trust Board 2010).  
Short of two centuries later, the conflict was legally resolved with the signing of the 
Whanganui River Deed of Settlement (Ruruka Whakatupua) in 2014. As part of the settlement 
negotiations, Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (from here on 
                                                          
7 Detailed accounts of the history of conflicts about the Whanganui River can be found in Hutchison (2014), 
Talbot-Jones (2017), O’Donnell and Talbot-Jones (2018), Talbot-Jones and Bennett (2019) and Kahui and 
Cullinane (2019). 
referred to as the 2017 Act) was passed granting legal personhood status to the Whanganui 
River. The property right is vested in the natural object itself, something Talbot-Jones and 
Bennett (2019) call resource self-determination, and is to be treated as a charitable entity and 
public body.  
Specifically, the 2017 Act gives legal recognition to the intrinsic values of the river (2017 Act; 
p.15); i.e., (a) the River is the source of spiritual and physical sustenance (“Te Awa Tupua is a 
spiritual and physical entity that supports and sustains both the life and natural resources 
within the Whanganui River and the health and well-being of the iwi, hapū and other 
communities of the River”); (b) the great River flows from the mountain to the sea (“Te Awa 
Tupua is an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains 
to the sea, incorporating all its physical and meta-physical elements”); (c) I am the River and 
the River is me (“The iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River have an inalienable connection 
with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its health and well-being”); and (d) the small 
and large streams that flow into one another form one River (“The Awa Tupua is a singular 
entity comprised of many elements and communities, working collaboratively for the 
common purpose of the health and well-being of Te Awa Tupua”)8.  
Last but not least, the 2017 Act gives effect to the provision that the human face of the river, 
the decision makers, must recognize and provide for the Te Awa Tupua status and the intrinsic 
value; i.e. in the case of the Whanganui River two persons are nominated; one by the 
Whanganui iwi and one on behalf of the Crown; an advisory group is established comprising 
                                                          
8 Similarly, Quebec’s Magpie River has been granted, in accordance with Innu customs, the right to flow; the right 
to respect for its cycles; the right for its natural evolution to be protected and preserved; the right maintain its 
natural biodiversity; the right to fulfil its essential functions within its ecosystem; the right to maintain its 
integrity; the right to be safe from pollution; the right to regenerate and be restored; and the right to sue. 
representatives of persons or organizations with interest in the Whanganui River, including 
iwi, relevant local authorities, departments of State, commercial and recreational users, and 
environmental groups. The purpose of the nominated persons and the advisory group is to 
“act collaboratively to advance the health and well-being of Te Awa Tupua” (2017 Act; p. 22).  
 
The economic case for environmental personhood (EP) 
The conceptualization of the EP has, until recently, been unthinkable, very much like the 
reluctant evolution and acceptance of CP through time. The explicit aim of an EP such as the 
Whanganui River is to uphold the intrinsic value of the natural object and promote and protect 
its health and wellbeing. The Whanganui EP is represented by a ‘human face’ whose aim it is 
to act collaboratively, thereby providing for an anthropocentric perspective of stakeholder 
interactions. Talbot-Jones (2017) uses experimental game theory to predict that transaction 
costs are likely to increase for stakeholders when re-negotiating water use in the Whanganui 
River after the institutional transition to EP. The experiment focuses on bargaining costs as a 
measure of transaction costs, noting that the transaction costs associated with designing, 
implementing, and operating EP for the Whanganui River are extensive and will further add 
to the bargaining costs explored in the experiment. The experiment also finds that these 
negotiations may change the proportion of flow allocated to consumptive use to more 
sustainable levels, thereby addressing concerns of overuse. 
We posit that in the case of the Whanganui River, the lack of property rights by stakeholders 
whose access to navigation, fisheries and eel weirs was diminished and who promoted the 
intrinsic value of the natural entity as well as those of future generations, constitutes a 
transaction cost in addition to the costs of EP establishment and negotiation. In his second 
seminal article “The problem of social cost” (1960) Coase illustrates how agents, in the 
presence of external effects, will find optimal allocations, regardless of who possesses the 
property rights, if transaction costs are negligible. Allen (1991) clarifies that when externalities 
are present, transaction costs are in fact the costs of establishing, maintaining and securing 
property rights, such that zero transaction costs imply perfect property rights.9 One of Coase’s 
insights was that in the presence of external effects, where the price mechanism is societally 
inefficient, transaction costs provide a powerful reason to consider alternative institutional 
arrangements to approximate “the unattainable ideal of the (mythical) world of zero 
transaction costs” (Merrill & Smith 2017; p. 38). Williamson (1971) extends the argument of 
transaction costs to consider any governance structure as a distribution of property rights that 
maximizes the gains from trade net of all costs, both within and outside firms. 
In the case of the Whanganui River, the continued degradation of the river’s health due to 
economic development imposed an externality on the Whanganui iwi who had, 
unsuccessfully, spent nearly two centuries trying to establish a property right on behalf of the 
intrinsic value of the river and the sustainable consumptive and non-consumptive use of the 
river for future generations. The iwi’s grievances, and their continued legal efforts to secure 
the right of decision making represented a real cost to the iwi, including court costs, time, 
effort and emotional and spiritual harm.  
These type of transaction costs are mirrored, to some degree, by the climate change crisis, 
showing that the transaction costs involved in efficiently sorting the many ecosystem service 
trade-offs connected to human activity across generations have become insurmountable. 
Within generation, the loss and degradation of natural environments worldwide is seen as one 
of our planet’s most serious challenges, leading to massive ecosystem service trade-offs 
                                                          
9 However, the reverse is not necessarily true, see Allen (1991, p. 899). 
seldom taken into account (MEA 2005, IPBES 2017).  As Coase (1937 p. 83) puts it, there is “a 
cost of using the price mechanism”, but this cost is even higher and increasingly untenable 
when the societal price mechanism for ecosystem services is plagued by externalities. The 
societal price mechanism is not well-functioning because many of the ecosystem services we 
lose do not exist directly in commercial markets and have largely been unknown. This explains 
why EP has largely not appeared earlier. I.e., EP or the nature equivalent of the firm, has not 
had a clear raison d’etre, as much of its ‘produce’ is enjoyed outside commercial markets; was 
earlier not affected by scarcity; is part of local or global commons; or is far removed in time 
and space from current ‘consumers’.  This is changing with the growing awareness of the 
enormous non-market values connected to natural environments (Costanza et al. 1997; 2014), 
making EP a structure of increasing relevance.   
The school of new institutional economics posits that new institutions emerge when the 
benefits they confer are greater than the transaction costs involved in creating and sustaining 
them (Teraji 2018). In the case of the Whanganui River, the continued conflicts between the 
iwi and the Crown imposed a cost sufficiently larger than the cost involved in transitioning to 
a new institutional arrangement. EP can be seen as a property rights structure opening for the 
organization of relevant stakeholders, including those advocating on behalf of the 
environment and future generations, and allowing for interactions that mediate transaction 
costs, thereby creating a price mechanism that includes the cost of externalities. In the 
discipline of neoclassical economics, externalities are potentially internalized by public 
regulation in the shape of economic incentive mechanisms, such as environmental taxes. 
However, as the extent of externalities has become increasingly complex, involving a range of 
human interactions, including private firms, communities, social groups, the general public, 
youth movements and indigenous communities representing future generation, public 
regulation via controls or taxes becomes highly demanding, and potentially impossible. In the 
EP setting, these externalities, i.e. societal costs of human economic activity, are costs 
appropriated directly by stakeholders within the ‘nature firm’, and thus internalized, thereby 
reducing transaction costs.   
Bar the few examples mentioned in this paper, EPs are largely non-existent. However, 
analogously to the legal structure of CP mediating transaction costs among economic agents, 
we posit that EP might be expected to reduce the overall transaction costs related to human 
interaction with natural environments by defining the property right in the resource itself and 
allowing for negotiation among all relevant stakeholders. In Table 1 we try to simplistically 
illustrate the logical differences between CP, governance bodies and EP, focusing on 
objectives, the mediation of transaction costs and the stakeholders involved. 
Table 1 shows that the central objectives vary according to entity and type of personhood. CPs 
are commonly understood to maximize profits, but stakeholder models in the business ethics 
and management literature show corporations to pursue much broader perspectives than just 
value maximization (Hart 2011; Blanc 2016). Transaction cost theories for firms have been well 
expounded in the literature and augmented by organizational capabilities theories, asset 
specificity and modern contract theory (see e.g. Cheung 1983; Williamson 1979; 1981). The 




Table 1. Transaction cost mediators according to type of personhood. 
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national governance 
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Social welfare  Legal, structural and 
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The above  
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Personhood (EP)  
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and non-use; relational), 
subject to intrinsic value  
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between different 
ecosystem service users, 
and nature/future 
generation representatives 
in the EP 
The above  
+ stakeholders 
advocating on behalf 
of the intrinsic value of 




Though society, in its representation by local, regional and national governance entities, has 
a broader objective than corporations, the organization of society, and how it includes 
transaction costs, may not necessarily incorporate the objectives of EP. I.e., legal recognition 
is awarded to the intrinsic value of the Whanganui River, the capability to sustain its 
ecosystem functions, while allowing for the sustainable utilization of water for consumptive 
and non-consumptive stakeholders. As such, one can envisage EP to focus on the total 
economic value (TEV) of an ecosystem, as encompassing all ecosystem service use, non-use 
and relational values, subject to intrinsic value of the river. In other words, the maximization 
of values that are not compatible with conservation is constrained by the environment’s 
inherent worth and capability to maintain its ecosystem functions. Clearly there may be 
overlap between EP and societal objectives, but the EP’s focus on intrinsic value, as well as 
inclusion of nature and future generations as stakeholders, is broader and more inclusive than 
most national, regional and local governance.  
What might determine the extent of an EP in future, i.e. how large should the ecosystem 
included in the EP be, and what stakeholders or rights holders might be incorporated in the 
objective of the EP? The size and vertical integration of firms, or the integration and inter-
dependence of at least two single-output production processes within a single firm, is 
determined by technological economies, transaction economies and market imperfections 
(Perry, 1989). We may consider the ‘production’ of ecosystem services within the ‘nature firm’ 
in a similar fashion. Rather than corporate vertical integration, however, social horizontal 
integration is a better term for EP. The extent, or horizontal integration of ecosystem service 
production, may be determined by the natural equivalent of technological economies, 
transaction costs and externalities outside the EP. For instance, commercial and recreational 
fisheries, provisioning and cultural services, respectively, are both dependent on the effective 
management of fish stocks. Management may, in turn, be impacted by other services in the 
coastal zone, such as aquaculture and the externalities of emissions therefrom. Transaction 
costs and externalities may therefore delineate the extent of EP entities, both in 
environmental and stakeholder terms. The cost of contractual and governance exchange 
within an EP versus without an EP can be expected to determine the optimal level of horizontal 
integration, or the societal and environmental extent of an EP. Geographically, based on the 
relevant ecosystem extent, an EP may cross jurisdictional lines, be transboundary and 
transnational, or even multinational.  
Clearly there are governance complexities connected to EPs, but these challenges do not 
necessarily differ substantially from those surrounding the governance of corporations and 
other entities. All organizations must determine what they aim to accomplish, as well as how 
they can keep score and measure performance (Jensen 2010). This will also apply to EPs. 
Discussions around corporate governance span stakeholder versus shareholder models for 
management (Jones et al. 2002), utilitarian versus more egalitarian business models and 
whether a single-valued objective function is required (Jensen 2010). Problematic issues 
relating to the lack of future generation stakeholders and uncertainties such as currently 
unknown externalities, both positive and negative, remain. These latter issues will, however, 
be a challenge for all types of environmental governance, and at a minimum, the explicit focus 
on intrinsic value puts these unknowns in the forefront, making EPs potentially more effective 
than other types of governance structures.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
It may seem inconceivable to award legal rights to natural objects, but the call to maintain and 
restore ecosystem services for intergenerational wellbeing is growing. Management of 
economic activity in natural environments worldwide is largely sectoral, with limited capacity 
to address the inter-dependent and cumulative effects of resource uses, and often ignoring 
non-commercial interests. The continued degradation of ecosystems poses an externality to 
society and can be understood as a lack of property rights of stakeholders advocating on 
behalf of the intrinsic value of natural systems and future generations. The attempt to 
delineate and capture such property rights represent a transaction cost that is borne and 
voiced by climate change movements and indigenous communities, as well as local, regional 
and national environmental conflicts that are carried out in court and the public domain. In 
practice, these costs are borne by anyone who supports efforts to preserve natural systems, 
in-kind, financially or in any other tangible way.  The introduction of EP provides an innovative 
way of addressing these issues. We link to the history of the emergence of corporations as 
legal entities and the theory of the firm, in order to explore the evolvement of EP to allow for 
ecosystem service trade-offs in competing uses and benefits of multiple stakeholders, 
including those representing intrinsic value and future generations.  
However, there are fundamental differences. Firstly, the property right is vested in the natural 
object itself under EP, which stands in contrast to the private or public ownership of CPs by 
shareholders; and secondly, the primary objective of EP is to uphold the intrinsic value of the 
natural object and promote and protect its health and wellbeing. This can be interpreted as 
the inherent value of the environment to maintain itself and its capacity to provide ecosystem 
services. One can envisage the evolution of EP, as an anthropocentric construct, to focus on 
the total economic value (TEV) of a system, subject to or constrained by the bottom line to 
uphold the integrity of a natural system, the measurement of which may include key 
environmental indicators and/or indigenous local knowledge. This may bridge the unease 
between instrumental and intrinsic worldviews that have plagued the environmental 
valuation literature to date. 
Naffine (2012) points out that secular rationalists and conservative Christians have been the 
two influential families of thinkers that have sustained anthropocentrism in that “they focus 
almost exclusively on the human species and the perceived limits of its interests” (p. 69). 
Animals and the environment have traditionally fallen outside the borders of legal 
personhood. Stone (1972) and O’Donell and Talbot-Jones (2018) argue that there are 
elements of nature that are not captured by the existing anthropocentric paradigms of natural 
capital or ecosystem services, alluding to the intrinsic value of nature10. The valuation of 
intrinsic value is, by definition, outside of neoclassic, anthropocentric economic methods, but 
within a TEV setting, studies have shown the public acceptance of and willingness to pay to 
protect ecosystem components due to their existence per se (see e.g. Aanesen et al, 2015)11. 
Furthermore, the understanding of how natural environments are important to foster both 
inter- and intra-generational relationships has grown but is not easily captured by traditional 
economic methods. Increasingly, studies are starting to verify the presence of such values in 
terms of relational values (see e.g. Ashbulby et al. 2013; Ruiz-Frau et al. 2013; Arias-Arevola 
et al. 2017; Uehara et al. 2020).    
Whether EP will end up playing as important a role in society as CP has over the last centuries, 
remains to be seen, but it provides an innovative governance framework to meet some of the 
pressing challenges of our time in relation to how humans interact with nature. Limited 
liability, argued to be one of humanities’ great inventions (Mahoney 2000), may translate into 
                                                          
10 Stone (1972) makes point that injury inflicted upon a natural entity is not the same as harm to human interests 
in the resource. 
11 Methods to value non-commercial ecosystem services are well accepted and are often categorized into stated 
(hypothetical) and revealed preferences techniques to elicit individuals’ or households’ willingness to pay to 
conserve the services, the aggregate of which is often represented in the TEV framework.  
 
risk mitigation for the EP ‘board of directors’, who are organized around the representation 
of current and future stakeholders. How exactly such representation is enacted remains to be 
seen but will likely follow established organizational structures of community and local 
government representation. Some of the questions surrounding CP, such as whether a 
corporation is a real entity with its own will or whether it is a mere association of individuals 
forming a contract among themselves (Iwai 1999), may not be as relevant for EP given its 
physical nature; but in the specific aspect of transaction costs, EP solves many of the same 
problems CP does. The EP enables a natural system to own its own assets, separate and 
distinct from those constituting the stakeholders. Stakeholders may sign contracts with the EP 
delineating rights of utilization, appropriation and conservation, thereby simplifying the 
network of contractual agreements between stakeholders and reducing transaction costs. 
However, when taking the functions and powers of an EP to their limit, possible apprehensions 
may arise, such as whether EPs should be allowed to sue and be sued in the same way as CPs. 
An argument can be made that EPs should be suable entities in the same way that firms are. 
If an employee in a firm is injured by an earthquake while at work, the company can only be 
sued for damages if it is guilty of negligence in relation to mandatory employee security within 
the company’s control, as opposed to the effects of a disaster outside the company’s control. 
In a similar way, a river EP could be sued for flood damages if the EP has allowed for activities 
that actively contributed to the diminished ability of the natural system to regulate flooding 
(such as by the removal of flood-absorptive wetlands or the building of hydro-dams), but not 
if the flooding has occurred as a natural consequence of excessive rain that pushed the 
ecosystem beyond its carrying capacity. This of course also raises the issue of how EPs will be 
able to cover damages when decisions are made that require monetary reparations. Clearly 
an EP does supply biotic and abiotic ecosystem services that could involve possible payments 
from recipients. There may also be resource rents created, that could be extracted. Indeed, 
these potential revenues could even be taxed by local, regional or national entities. This 
illustrates the possibility of the EP structure turning into a commercial form of corporate unit, 
opening for many critical issues (Donyets-Kedar 2017), underlining the importance of how 
stakeholders connected to non-monetary and potential future benefits are represented in the 
EP.  Indeed, this illustrates that if EPs do emerge as a potential way of organizing the meeting 
point between humans and nature, then these and many other aspects will be discussed and 
analyzed intensely in centuries to come, in the same way that corporate legal personhood has 
been debated since the middle ages.    
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